Open Life as the central possible world and default anthropology in political philosophy

The main proposition of this study is to suggest that Open Lifespan/Open Life should be the central possible world and the default underlying anthropology behind moral and political philosophy. I think morality should be redefined by making the case for moral persons with open-ended lifespans. This Open Lifespan sub-study is being published in several subsequent posts, here are the ones already published.

Open Lifespan within the possible world framework 

Open Life as the central possible world and default anthropology in moral philosophy 

Open Life’s temporal value-pluralism enables neutrality towards different concepts of good life 

Let’s see some high-level details concerning political philosophy, some of them already investigated and summarised here, some of them to be investigated further. Continue reading “Open Life as the central possible world and default anthropology in political philosophy”

Open Life’s temporal value-pluralism enables neutrality towards different concepts of good life

This is my first, separate and somewhat rudimentary take on investigating a crucial moral and political problem in the context of Open Lifespan: value-pluralism and the different concepts of a good life. Hence, the concepts used and the argument developed are in their initial form and it may well be that the second, third … formulation will lead to different concepts and modify the argument. Continue reading “Open Life’s temporal value-pluralism enables neutrality towards different concepts of good life”

Open Life as the central possible world and default anthropology in moral philosophy

Introduction

The main proposition of this study is to suggest that Open Lifespan/Open Life should be the default underlying anthropology behind moral and political philosophy. I think morality should be redefined by making the case for moral persons with open-ended lifespans. This study will be published in 5 subsequent posts, the first, mainly methodological post has been already published and showed how Open Life can be handled as a limiting possible world within the framework of morally relevant possible worlds. The second post here details the main proposition in the context of moral philosophy and the third, upcoming post details the proposition concerning political philosophy. The fourth post will mention some problems where assuming Closed Lifespan leads to preventable troubles in moral and political philosophy and the fifth post will raise constructive objections that help to further sharpen this Open Lifespan angle by posing further limits on it.

Next I provide details, descriptions, analytical elaborations, arguments mixing object with meta level in 6 different but connected points. Continue reading “Open Life as the central possible world and default anthropology in moral philosophy”